STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS:
RESULTS: Approximately 1.65 million delayed, largevolume bacterial culture-screened PCs in the United Kingdom and 2.3 million amotosalen/ultraviolet-A-treated PCs worldwide were issued with no reported septic fatalities. One definite, one possible, and 12 undetermined/ indeterminate septic reactions and eight contaminated "near misses" were reported with delayed, large-volume bacterial cultures between 2011 and 2016, for a lower false-negative culture rate than that in the previous 5 years (5.4 vs. 16.3 per million: odds ratio, 3.0; 95% confidence interval, 1.4-6.5). Together, the Belgian, Swiss, and French hemovigilance programs documented zero probable or definite/certain septic reactions with 609,290 amotosalen/ ultraviolet-A-treated PCs (<1.6 per million). The rates were significantly lower than those reported with concurrently transfused, nonpathogen-reduced PCs in Belgium (<4.4 vs. 35.6 per million: odds ratio, 8.1; 95% confidence interval,1.1-353.3) and with historic septic reaction rates in Switzerland (<6.0 vs. 82.9 per million: odds ratio, 13.9; 95% confidence interval, 2.1-589.2), and the rates tended to be lower than those from concurrently transfused, nonpathogen-reduced PCs in France (<4.7 vs. 19.0 per million: odds ratio, 4.1; 95% confidence interval, 0.7-164.3).
CONCLUSION: Pathogen reduction and bacterial culture both reduced the incidence of septic reactions, although under-reporting and strict imputability criteria resulted in an underestimation of risk.
B
acterial contamination of platelet concentrates (PCs) remains a major risk of transfusion despite widespread implementation of optimum skinpreparation and initial sample-diversion techniques. Additional interventions are warranted, and available options include bacterial culture soon after collection, rapid bacterial detection tests at the time of transfusion, and pathogen-reduction (PR) technologies. Bacterial culture screening using the BacT/ALERT 3D system (bioMerieux) has been widely implemented, and multiple hemovigilance (HV) programs have documented its relative success (for review, see Benjamin and McDonald, 2014) . 1 Many preanalytical and analytical variables affect culture outcomes, and false-negative results determined by culture of expired PCs range from 662 to 2173 per million platelet concentrates (PCs). The frequency of septic reactions ranges from 0 to 66 per million transfusions. 1 Similarly, multiple rapid bacterial tests are described for use close to the time of transfusion, but outcomes data proving their clinical efficacy are limited, [2] [3] [4] [5] and HV data in routine practice are awaited. Three PR processes for platelets are Conformit e Europ eene (CE) marked; however, the THERA-FLEX ultraviolet (UV)-platelets system (UVC-platelets; Macopharma)
is not yet marketed. The Mirasol PR treatment system (riboflavin/UV; Terumo BCT) is widely marketed; however, HV data on clinical outcomes are limited. [6] [7] [8] [9] The INTERCEPT blood system (amotosalen/UVA light; Cerus Corporation) is approved by the US Food and Drug Administration. Clinical outcomes data are available from randomized controlled trials and observational studies [10] [11] [12] and from national HV programs in France, Switzerland, and Belgium. PR using amotosalen/UVA-light and delayed large-volume bacterial culture (DLVBC) screening with the BacT/ALERT system share extensive clinical HV experience published by regulatory authorities as well as in vitro technology assessments that document their efficacy. 1, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] Confirmed documentation of a septic transfusion reaction (STR) is challenging when effective processes are implemented, and high-imputability cases are rare, because other causes may be more likely. HV programs generally define definite STRs as those in which a transfusion reaction is associated with the same bacterial strain in recipient blood cultures and the residual PCs. However, causes other than failure of the bacterial-detection or PR system should be considered, including improper performance of culture screening or PR; late contamination during post-manufacture storage (i.e., caused by "pin holes" or bag leaks) 19, 20 ; or false-positive bag cultures due to retrograde flushing of the intravenous line by contaminated blood from the recipient. 21 With both PR and DLVBC interventions, the latter causes need to be excluded before it can be concluded that the bacterial protection system has failed. In this report, we review suspected STRs reported by the UK Serious Hazards of Transfusion (UK SHOT) HV system 22 after DLVBC screening was implemented by the National Health System Blood and Transplant (NHSBT), which issued 85.5%, and the Northern Ireland Blood Transfusion Service (NIBTS) which issued 2.9% of all PCs in the United Kingdom in 2016 23 ; cases reported to the Swiss, Belgian, and French HV systems; and spontaneous reports to Cerus Corporation after amotosalen/UVA-light implementation. Case reports are provided that highlight the difficulty in interpreting HV data and the level of investigation increasingly required when determining imputability.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
HV data for platelet bacterial contamination and transfusion-related sepsis from the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Switzerland were compiled for various years between 2005 and 2016 relative to the introduction of DLVBC or amotosalen/UVA-light PR. Comparisons of HV data from national systems suffer from limitations, which include dissimilar donor populations and underlying rates of bacterial contamination; various armdisinfection techniques; the use of whole-blood versus apheresis PCs; as well as variable and incomplete patient assessments, different definitions of outcomes, and variations in the rigor of reporting. 1 The imputability definitions described in the HV reports for STR vary and are listed in Table 1 . [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] Cerus Corporation uses Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Healthcare Safety Network criteria for imputability assessments. 25 None of the HV programs provide a detailed description of those criteria or how they are used. The French, Belgian, and Swiss HV programs report probable and definite/certain cases together, preventing comparisons within each subgroup. Given these limitations, formal comparisons of outcomes from different HV programs are considered to have less value than comparisons of varying approaches used within the same country. DLVBC screening was instituted by the NHSBT in England and North Wales in February 2011, and in the NIBTS for all apheresis and buffy-coat PCs, allowing for a 7-day shelf-life after delayed release into inventory on Day 3 after collection. 18 At NHSBT screening is performed on a 16-mL to 20-mL sample taken from each PC 36 hours after donation. At NIBTS a 16-mL sample is taken 48 hours after collection from the mother bag. For both services, an 8-mL inoculum per bottle is incubated under both aerobic and anaerobic conditions on the BacT/ ALERT system until the end of the shelf-life. 16 The UK did and did not use PR. 30 Collection and skin-disinfection methods, initial sample diversion, and leukocytereduction practices were consistent within the country. 30 Amotosalen/UVA-light treatment of PCs was introduced in Belgium for approximately 40% of the PC supply in 2009 and for the entire country by November 2015. Conventional PCs were culture screened using 4-mL to 8-mL samples inoculated into aerobic culture bottles the day after collection. 31 Amotosalen/UVA-treated PCs were stored with a 7-day shelf-life until 2010; then, storage was reduced to 5 days. Annual HV reports are published by the Federaal Agentschap voor Geneesmiddelen en Gezondheidsproducten. The data between 2009 and 2015 were compiled, and concurrently collected data were compared from areas using bacterial detection with those using PR. 25 Between 2003 and 2010, Cerus Corporation conducted active HV phase IV studies in Europe. 11, 32, 33 A report describing transfusion-related adverse events was required for each transfusion, regardless of outcome.
11,12
Cerus Corporation also receives spontaneous reports of adverse events that are suspected to involve amotosalen/ UVA-treated platelets. These were investigated and reported to national regulatory agencies, as required by law. Case reports pertaining to Swiss and Belgian HV reports were summarized to provide a clinical context for those reports.
Statistical analysis
Data from HV studies are presented descriptively, and illustrative cases reports are provided, as defined by the individual HV programs. Comparison of STR rates was performed using odds ratios (ORs), and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were determined using the Fisher exact test. For point estimates with zero values, the rates, ORs, and 95% CIs were determined assuming a minimum value of 1, and the rates are depicted as "less than" the calculated value.
RESULTS
In the United Kingdom, the SHOT data for 2006 through 2010, before the implementation of DLVBC screening, were summarized (Table 2) : 13 contaminated PCs derived from seven collections were involved in 10 confirmed STRs, including three fatalities; in addition, eight near misses were reported with the discovery of contaminated PCs before transfusion. This included one collection in 2009 that was associated with a single near miss contaminated PC and four co-component PC transfusions in one adult and one neonate. Ten contaminated PCs from seven collections and five near misses were previously reported to the NHSBT by McDonald and colleagues. 18 In total, 1,286,821 PCs were issued during these years, for an overall rate of proven PC contamination of 16.3 per million ( Fig. 1 ) and an overall fatality rate of 2.3 per million. 23 With DLVBC screening from 2011 through 2016, 1,652,761 PCs were issued in the United Kingdom, and no septic fatalities were reported. One confirmed STR (nonfatal) and one possible STR were reported (Table 2) . Twelve undetermined/indeterminate cases were described in which an STR could not be ruled out because of insufficient clinical information, although no further details were provided. In 450 suspected STR reports, the PCs could be excluded; and, in 152 cases, the PCs could be ruled out, although the basis of these determinations was not reported. Eight products derived from seven collections had visually detected clumps discovered before transfusion and were culture-positive for Staphylococcus aureus (7) and Serratia marcescens (1). Eight cocomponents of these contaminated PCs were identified as * Suspected STRs were excluded by the lack of bacteria in the PC product and/or negative patient cultures. † Ruled out suggests that there was no evidence that the transfusion was the cause of the infection. ‡ Indeterminants were cases in which an STR could not be ruled out because of the possibility of retrograde contamination of the PC after connection to an infusion set or by a lack of the PC bag available to culture. § Near misses occurred when the PC was noted to have an abnormal appearance before connection of the infusion set to the bag.
culture-negative and/or had been received in a transfusion without adverse events. The overall contamination rate from 2011 through 2016 is calculated at 5.4 per million issued PCs, which is significantly lower (OR, 3.0; 95% CI, 1.4-6.5) than in the prior 5-year period from 2006 to 2010. Three cases illustrative of the difficulty in determining imputability were described in more detail in the SHOT reports. One case in 2011 (Case S1, available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) was described as "undetermined," with the finding of Lactococcus lactis ssp. in a PC bag after a reaction compatible with an STR, but no patient cultures or further evidence were available to determine causality. A second case (Case S2, available as supporting information in the online version of this paper; also reported by McDonald and coworkers 18 ) in 2015 was considered a confirmed STR with documentation of the same strain of S. aureus from the patient's blood culture, the residual PC bag, and a swab from the donor's skin. A third case (Case S3, available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) was deemed a "possible STR": a patient experienced symptoms compatible with an STR, and the hospital reported that Streptococcus spp. was identified from the patient's blood culture 24 hours after transfusion. Streptococcus agalactiae and Escherichia coli were isolated from the returned PC pack. It was deemed impossible to confirm the PC as the source of the infection, and the case was interpreted as a "possible" STR and separately reported. 18, 23 (Fig. 1) . From 2011 to 2015, 167,200 apheresis and buffy-coat PCs treated with amotosalen/UVA were delivered by transfusion (Table 4) without reported probable or certain STRs 24 (<6.0 per million) or fatalities, which constituted a significant reduction (OR, 13.9; 95% CI, 2.1-589.2). In 2015, a single illustrative case that was classified as a "possible" STR by Swissmedic was mentioned without further description in the annual HV report (Case S4, available as supporting information in the online version of this paper describes the case as reported to Cerus Corporation Safety Monitoring Program). This case highlights the difficulty in imputing causality despite identification of the same bacterial strains in patient blood cultures and residual PCs. A second case (Case S5, available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) reported to Cerus Corporation as a "possible" STR by the hospital physician but deemed "unrelated" to the transfusion by the blood center and not reported by Swissmedic in the annual HV report, is presented here as a possible illustrative example of successful pathogen inactivation of a heavily bacterially contaminated PC, with the PC showing Gram stain positivity with negative bacterial cultures after a relatively mild transfusion reaction.
In Belgium, between 2009 and 2015, 252,809 conventional PCs screened with the BacT/ALERT culture system were distributed, and nine (35.6 per million) highprobability STRs were reported with zero fatalities (Table   5) . 25 12 Three reports of suspected STRs were reported, all of which were evaluated as "unrelated" by the investigators (Table 6 ). Subsequently, Cerus Corporation received six spontaneous reports of suspected STRs from blood services worldwide. In two cases evaluated as "unrelated," bacteria (S. hemolyticus, S. viridans) were isolated from the implicated PCs, patient cultures were negative or were not performed, and bacteria were ruled laboratory contaminants. In a third case, no evaluation of the residual component was performed, and evidence of contamination was lacking. Two cases from Switzerland are described above as Cases S4 and S5 available as supporting information in the online version of this paper. A final case of "possible STR" from Belgium was received in 2016 and is described as Case S6 (available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) as an additional illustration of the difficulty in ascribing the imputability of PC in suspected STR reactions when contamination of the PC at the time of transfusion cannot be excluded.
DISCUSSION
Bacterial culture screening and PR systems for PCs were developed and implemented based on in vitro assessments of analytical sensitivity or inactivation efficacy, respectively. It is only through large HV programs that their clinical impact can be measured. We describe the accumulating HV data in support of current highly effective bacterial culture and PR systems. Although alternate technologies for assuring bacterial safety are now in development or are available (e.g., rapid bacterial testing, 2 cold-stored 34 or frozen platelets, 35 delayed bacterial culture, 36, 37 etc.), proof of their efficacy in routine practice must await widespread implementation and accumulated HV data. DLVBC using the BacT/ALERT system, as performed by the NHSBT and NIBTS, are the current best-inclass culture systems, because of the large, successful experience monitored by the UK SHOT program and subsequently partially published in a separate report. 18 The findings support the in vitro data suggesting that the sensitivity of bacterial culture is increased by delayed sampling, 18, [38] [39] [40] use of large sample volumes (16-48 mL per PC collection), use of both aerobic and anaerobic cultures, 41 and testing of all apheresis split products. 18, 37, 42 Similarly, with best-in-class PR using amotosalen/UVA, substantial national HV reports evaluating clinical efficacy, head-to-head comparisons, and robust data on in vitro inactivation of a broad spectrum of bacterial species are available to confirm effectiveness. [13] [14] [15] 43 With DLVBC screening from 2011 to 2016, greater than 1.65 million PCs were delivered without any reported septic fatality. 23 False-negative cultures reported by UK SHOT included a single definite STR case (subsequently described by McDonald and coworkers 18 ) and eight contaminated products that were intercepted at the blood center or hospital blood bank, for an overall culture falsenegative rate of 5.4 per million cultured PCs (Fig. 1) , a significantly lower rate (p < 0.05) than that for the prior 5 years (2006 to 2010), when 21 PCs (16.3 per million) exhibited evidence of contamination. Interestingly, most near misses were S. aureus, suggesting that this species has a propensity to avoid detection by the BacT/ALERT system. The false-negative rate of DLVBC is lower than the 9.4 per million rate reported by the American Red Cross HV program using a less sensitive bacterial culture screening protocol with 4,063,371 distributed apheresis platelets 44 and the smaller Belgian experience with less sensitive bacterial culture 31 ( Fig. 1) but is similar to the recently reported 12 and 6 cases were subsequently spontaneously reported to Cerus safety program, including Case S4 (available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) mentioned in the Swiss HV report, Supporting Case S5 (available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) from Switzerland, and Case S6 (available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) from Belgium.
failure rate of 1 per 286,386 PCs (3.5 per million) using 3.8% minimal proportional sample volume bacterial culture screening. 45 The Swiss, French, Belgian, and Cerus Corporation HV data characterize the effectiveness of amotosalen/UVA treatment to prevent STRs. Approximately 2.3 million PCs have been manufactured worldwide (Cerus Corporation; unpublished data) without a reported septic fatality. The rates of STR with PR PCs were significantly lower than with concurrently transfused, non-PR, non-DLVBC culture-screened PCs in Belgium (<4.4 vs. 35.6 per million: OR, 8.1; 95% CI, 1.1-353.3) and tended to be lower than the rates with non-PR, nonculture-screened PCs in France (<4.7 vs. 19.0 per million: OR, 4.1; 95% CI, 0.7-164.3). The comparison of concurrent STR rates for PCs not prepared with PR and amotosalen/UVA-treated PCs within each country suggests that the low reported septic rate with PR is not due to failure to report reactions or different classifications of imputability. In Switzerland, the 2005 to 2010 Swissmedic annual HV reports described the prior experience before the introduction of PR, when no bacterial culture screening was utilized. 24 Bacterial contamination of PCs represented the highest risk related to blood components. The transfusion of bacterially contaminated PCs caused the death of two patients in 2005 and one in 2009. During the same period, 13 submitted reports of transfusion reactions were certainly or most probably caused by bacterially contaminated PCs. Six of those incidents were classified as life-threatening, and the other six were not severe reactions. 24 The implementation of amotosalen/UVA treatment of PCs resulted in a significant decline in the STR rate from 82.9 per million (with 19.1 fatalities per million) transfused PCs to <6.0 per million STRs (OR, 4.1; 95% CI, 0.7-164.3). Overall the French, Swiss, and Belgian national HV programs monitored a total of 609,290 amotosalen/UVAtreated PC transfusions without any reports of probable or definite/certain STRs or fatalities (<1.6 per million) ( Tables 3-5) . Together, the HV programs monitored a total of 2.98 million PC transfusions that were not pathogen reduced and recorded 71 high-probability septic reactions (23.8 per million) and 12 fatalities (4.0 per million). Interestingly, the rate was higher in Belgium (35.6 per million), where less sensitive bacterial culture screening and passive HV reporting was utilized, compared with France, where there was no bacterial culture screening and active HV reporting was used (19.0 per million) (Fig. 1) .
HV programs likely underestimate the prevalence of bacterial STRs, because stringent criteria are used to determine definite imputability, including evidence of patient infection and PC contamination and irrefutable evidence of a donor source, with confirmation of strain identity. Reports with incomplete investigations (e.g., because PCs are not available for culture) are considered undetermined or indeterminate. Some of these cases are probably due to bacterial contamination. Cases S3, S4 and S6 (available as supporting information in the online version of this paper) demonstrate the difficulty of imputing causality when retrograde contamination of PCs after connection to an infusion set cannot be excluded. Physicians also fail to recognize and/or to report sepsis, and patients may display no immediate symptoms resulting from PC contamination, often because of the concurrent receipt of antibiotic or anti-inflammatory medication. Hong and colleagues 46 recently reported a single-institution study in which all PCs screened by initial culture for bacteria after manufacture, but not using DLVBC, were cultured again on issue from the hospital blood bank: 20 contaminated units were identified of 51,440 screened (388 per million). No transfusion reactions were reported to the blood bank, yet five patients (97.2 per million) had signs and symptoms on retrospective review that were compatible with an STR occurring 9 to 24 hours after transfusion, including one fatality. 46, 47 These findings underscore the need for heightened vigilance for STRs related to PC transfusion. Signs and symptoms of an STR can occur up to 24 hours after transfusion. 46 Once sepsis is considered, a thorough investigation is necessary. This should involve two or more patient blood cultures to maximize the opportunity to detect bacteremia, 48 and the residual PC container should be secured and open ports sealed to prevent contamination. A sample from the residual PCs should be Gram-stained to facilitate immediate treatment of the patient, and enumeration should be performed by plate count to assess bacterial concentration. Cocomponents should be retrieved and cultured, and recipients of co-components should be evaluated for sepsis. Bacterial culture determination times need to be recorded as an indication of concentration if this is not possible by a plate count. Finally, the potential source of contamination needs to be investigated, which will be organism dependent. Environmental contaminants, such as Pseudomonas aeruginosa, will warrant investigation of blood service and hospital facilities. Organisms like S. aureus or Klebsiella pneumoniae will require investigation of the donor, including skin, oral, or fecal cultures, as indicated by the strain of the bacteria involved. 21 If the PC container is contaminated, then a thorough investigation will be necessary. The possibility that the culture or inactivation process was not performed or was not properly executed must be excluded. All efforts must be taken to rule out retrograde contamination by blood flowing from the patient, especially if the transfusion was performed through an intravenous catheter used for other medications. Contamination of the PC postmanufacturing should be excluded by examination for leaks in the bag. Irrefutable evidence of PC contamination includes a finding of contamination before the bag is connected to an infusion set (e.g., at the bedside) or evidence of PC contamination plus the same strain in a cocomponent, in the recipient of a co-component, or in cultures from the donor. Taken together, these findings highlight the difficulty in evaluating STR cases and emphasize the likelihood that HV systems will fail to capture all events as high-imputability cases. Amotosalen/UVA PR and DLVBC have both been proven to increase the safety of the blood supply. It is unlikely that amotosalen/UVA PR will maintain its nearperfect record with regard to STRs, as documented by national HV programs, because imperfect reporting may have obscured cases. In vitro laboratory experiments under worst-case conditions demonstrate that PR can be overwhelmed by rapidly growing bacteria that exceed the system's inactivation capacity. Bacterial spores are relatively resistant to inactivation and are a particular risk. [49] [50] [51] Therefore, best-practice use of a PR system will require undertaking treatment within a defined period as defined by the manufacturer after collection to prevent potential growth beyond the capability of the system. The converse is true for bacterial screening, in which sampling is best performed as late as possible to maximize detection, allowing bacteria time to grow to sufficient numbers. Nevertheless, for the amotosalen/UVA treatment system, the manufacturer-defined specifications take into account efficacy within a defined treatment window, allowing for the possibility of bacterial growth between collection and PR treatment. Based on the cumulative HV surveillance data, the amotosalen/UVA system appears to be at least as (and potentially more) effective than the DLVBC system to prevent sepsis. In addition, amotosalen/UVA treatment provides protection against viruses and protozoa; it can replace other procedures, such as gamma irradiation; and treated platelets may be released into inventory 1 or 2 days earlier than with DLVBC, allowing for the transfusion of fresher platelets. 
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Case S1: United Kingdom. In a case ruled as undetermined in 2011, 23 bacteria were isolated from the implicated PC: A child received an apheresis PC; the patient's blood pressure, pulse and temperature decreased; and breathlessness, nausea/vomiting, and a rash developed. The patient was not on and did not receive antibiotics, and no blood cultures were taken. The empty PC was returned to the blood service with one leaking port, washed with saline, and Lactococcus lactis ssp. lactis was isolated. No confirmatory tests could be performed. The patient received transfusion of a cocomponent with no adverse reaction. The case was considered "undetermined" due to a lack of sufficient information to rule out environmental contamination. Case S2: United Kingdom. In 2015, a 6-day-old, whole blood-derived, pooled PC was transfused to a neutropenic woman age approximately 70 years with acute myeloid leukemia. 23 Fifteen minutes into the transfusion, the patient became agitated, experienced rigors and tachycardia, and her temperature spiked to 38.78C then rose overnight to 408C. The transfusion was stopped, and the patient was given hydrocortisone, chlorphenamine, and antibiotics. She recovered and was discharged. The bacterial culture sample obtained during manufacture was negative at Day 7, and investigation revealed no procedural errors. The same molecular strain of S. aureus was isolated from patient blood cultures, residual PC pack cultures, and donor skin swabs. This case was interpreted as a confirmed STR and was reported separately by McDonald and colleagues. 18 Case S3: United Kingdom. In 2015, a 50-year-old female outpatient received transfusion of a 7-day-old, whole blood-derived, pooled PC for aplastic anemia. 23 The patient routinely received pretransfusion prophylaxis with hydrocortisone and chlorphenamine. Halfway through the transfusion, the patient developed rigors and angioedema with stable blood pressure. The patient was admitted, treated with antibiotics and steroids, and recovered. Bacterial culture of the PC during manufacture was negative, and no procedural errors were detected. The hospital reported that Streptococci spp. was identified from the patient blood culture 24 hours after transfusion. S. agalactiae and E. coli were isolated from the returned PC pack. It was not possible to confirm the PC as the source of the infection, and the case was interpreted as a "possible" STR and reported separately by McDonald and coworkers.
18,23
Case S4: Switzerland. In 2015, an 89-year-old male inpatient received a PC before planned surgery and suffered an acute reaction 35 minutes after initiating transfusion of an amotosalen/UVA-treated apheresis PC. Symptoms included fever (39.58C), hypertension (158/ 69 mm Hg), tachycardia (148 beats per minute), shivering, and dyspnea. The patient was treated with antihistamines and steroids, and his symptoms resolved within 6 hours without antibiotics. Blood cultures were taken during the event, and the residual PC bag was sampled 6 hours later and cultured. The patient had a history of high-dose steroid and intravenous immunoglobulin treatment for idiopathic thrombocytopenia and was stable and afebrile before transfusion. Microbiology results received 24 hours later revealed a negative Gram stain of the residual PC but positive cultures for K. pneumoniae from the PC bag and patient blood cultures, with identical antibiotic-resistance profiles. Antibiotics were initiated, and the patient recovered. The investigator reported the case as a probable STR. An assessment by Cerus Corporation raised the possibility of retrograde contamination from the infusion set to the bag during transport to the microbiology department after the component was connected to the infusion set. The event was ruled as "possibly related" to the transfusion
